Looking at the eastern Med trade from an Asian geopolitical perspective
 In recent times the Chinese foreign policy community tended view American engagement in the eastern Mediterranean somewhat positively because it prevented the United States from focusing solely on Asia and offered some degree of protection for the rapidly increasing numbers of Chinese companies in the region.
But as the US became increasingly criticised for its military interventions in the region, so too did Chinese tacit approval of American involvement evaporate, particularly now that many fear Chinese interests might suffer from American action, writes Andrea Ghiselli, PhD candidate at Shanghai's Fudan University and Research Fellow with the Torino World Affairs Institute.
"Indeed, as emphasised by Liu Zhongmin, the director of the Shanghai International Studies University’s Middle East Studies Institute, as the Chinese economic and diplomatic presence in the region expands, China also becomes more sensitive to American policy shifts," Mr Ghiselli said.
Thus it is important, he said, writing in Tokyo's Diplomat magazine, to have a better understanding of what China’s presence looks like beyond the usual, general references to energy dependence and an alleged Sino-Russian de facto alliance.
First of all, one must take in a view that includes what can be called an enlarged Mediterranean region stretching from the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. Although such a conglomeration of countries, extremely different among each other, might make little sense at first, the truth is that they form a complex ecosystem of people and goods moving from one place to the other thanks to connecting trade lanes.
Chinese economic, and thus political, interests are not immune to these forces. Thanks to a number of factors - the enlargement of the Suez Canal, trends in the shipping industry and technology towards the creation of big alliances and fleet composed of fewer, but bigger ships, and the difficulty for American ports to easily take care of the biggest modern megaships - the Mediterranean Sea and the shipping routes going to and passing through are becoming increasingly important for China’s trade.
Indeed, Chinese investments in port terminals and harbours, from Abu Dhabi to Suez and Greece, just to mention a few, have been growing in the past few years. Djibouti is becoming the new Chinese trade, financial and military, hub in the region.
Cosco Shipping Ports only recently took a US$228 million 51 per cent share in port and rail assets in Valencia and Bilboa at the western end of the Med, having long secured a majority stake in Greece's largest port, Piraeus at the eastern end.
These are clear manifestations of the fact that we have to look beyond China’s energy ties with the Gulf countries, which have been providing China around the 40 per cent of its yearly energy imports (equivalent to an average of 10 per cent of the energy consumed in China every year) over the past decade and half.
Indeed, China has steadily become one of the top trade partners for all the countries in South Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Although compared to Europe and other advanced economies most of the Middle Eastern and North Africa countries are not yet important markets for Chinese products, China aims at integrating them in its global chains of production within the framework of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) and make them example of a new, modern, and efficient, “made in China” brand. Consistently, the number of engineering contracts awarded to Chinese companies and of Chinese workers in the region have been surging. The shock of the 2011 Libyan crisis had only temporary effects.
But while China has many economic partners, its political relations with regional and extra-regional powers are more fragile. Iran and Turkey are often mentioned by Chinese scholars as pivotal countries for the governance of the region, especially when thinking about the eventual expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Nevertheless, either because Iran might recalibrate its economic strategy favouring European products, or because of rising instability and nationalism in Turkey, Chinese analysts call for cautiousness in approaching those two countries.
The European countries are hardly seen as capable or useful partners. The disastrous military adventures in the region, especially Libya, are understandably interpreted negatively by China. Cooperation with them should be based on the acknowledgement that China is not a secondary actor, especially in Africa. Security cooperation, a Chinese scholar advised recently, should be pursued directly with North African and Middle Eastern countries.
Although depicting China and Russia as allies trying to obstruct the United States in the region sounds catchy, the Chinese are well aware that Russia’s goals do not necessarily overlap with China’s. Russian “opportunistic” diplomacy in the region might fuel further chaos.
In the face of such a difficult choice in finding reliable partners, China’s growing reliance on the United Nations to try to ensure regional stability through peacekeeping missions and antipiracy patrols is easy to understand. Not surprisingly then, after a significant growth of the level of engagement in peacekeeping operations, now China is also aiming to placing one of his officers at the helm of the United Nations’Department of Peacekeeping.
Going forward there is little doubt that China’s economic engagement with the larger Mediterranean region will keep growing in the foreseeable future under the auspices of the OBOR initiative, both shaping and being shaped by the regional economic and political landscapes. Yet, the Chinese strategic community is also well aware that it is necessary to avoid being drawn too deeply into regional affairs, especially when the use of military force is part of the debate.
Thus, it is unlikely that China will take sides clearly with any of the potential partners mentioned above. Direct friction between Chinese and American interests in the larger Mediterranean region is rather unlikely in the foreseeable future, but China’s growing sensitivity and the US president’s apparent insensitivity hardly make a good fit.
Nevertheless, US President Donald Trump’s evident success in pressuring the China to cut support for North Korea, and his simultaneous missile strike in Syria can be considered a successful American show of force and determination. It also stands as a reminder that the same tomahawks missiles may wing North Korea's way if China cannot persuade its erstwhile ally to sit down and behave.
Which all has much to do with keeping goods flowing from the Far East to the Mediterranean, Africa and beyond. |
