An EU without Britain on the road to becoming a more socialist and protectionist without British checks and balances
 There is every indication that the European Union will become more socialist, more centrally-planned, less democratic and more bureaucratic simply because Britain will not be there to block these otherwise prevailing tendencies.
Another big and more immediate question that arises in the absence of Britain in the EU is the role of the English language. It has long been an EU joke that "bad English" is the lingua franca of the EU, but no member state, except the UK has ever laid claim to it as an official language. Even Ireland, where 99.9 of its citizens use English in daily life, but they coyly say Gaelic is their official language, even though hardly anyone speaks it and its last unilingual speaker, an old woman on a remote Atlantic island, died in the 1980s.
Yet when the British Members of the European Parliament decamped for home, Danuta Hubner, the head of the European Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs, argued that after Brexit, English would no longer be an EU language: "We have a regulation, where every EU country has the right to notify one official language. The Irish have notified Gaelic, and the Maltese have notified Maltese, so you have only the UK notifying English. If we don’t have the UK, we don't have English."
But 80 per cent of EU legislative proposals are drafted in English. The role of English as a lingua franca is likely to continue as staff relies on it. Moreover, in European schools, 97 per cent of children learn English as an additional language, compared with 34 per cent learning French and 23 per cent learning German.
When the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the EU's predecessor in 1973, French was the dominant language of the institutions. With the addition of Sweden and Finland in the 1990s, and the Eastern European states in the 2000s, English supplanted French as the dominant working language of the institutions.
Another problem to the EU must face is the loss of a net contributor to EU funds. The UK's contribution to the EU budget in 2016, after accounting for its rebate, was EUR19.4 billion (US$21.6 billion). After removing about EUR7 billion that the UK receives in EU subsidies, the loss to the EU budget comes to five per cent of the total. Unless the budget is reduced, Germany, the largest net contributor, seems likely to be asked to provide the largest share of the cash, some EUR2.5 billion.
The European Commission has looked at reductions in regional spending of up to 30 per cent, which has concerned some of the poorer member states that rely heavily on the regional funds. However the EU has been under-spending on regional funds to the extent that EUR7.7 billion of unpaid funds was paid back to member states.
In 2020, some proposals consider a move down on the budgets for the Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, the EU’s space programme and military mobility.
The Horizon Europe fund would be EUR80 billion. Military mobility budget is also reduced: initial Commission proposal was EUR6.5 billion, Finnish presidency proposal was EUR2.5 billion, Council President Charles Michel’s proposal was EUR1.5 billion, and latest technical document of the Commission would make possible a zero funding increase.
The absence of the UK will change the complexion of the hitherto largely meaningless European Parliament which cannot pass laws and has no real veto power over decisions by the self-perpetuating cadres civil servants who run the governing European Commission. Nonetheless, it is capable of becoming a far more vocal cheerleader for causes championed by the governing Eurocrats. This tendency is the very thing that impelled Brexit in the first place.
But with Britain gone, there are far fewer opponents to the enactment of such measures to strengthen the bureaucracy. Thus it is likely Britain's departure will create a parliament more willing to pass extra regulations; have less support for copyright protection; pass budgets with increased member-state contributions; support taxation without the restraint of current treaties as well as oppose nuclear energy and shale gas in favour of renewable energy.
In short, times have passed when Europe cannot follow a course because the British will object. Now the British are gone, Europe can find its way to bureaucratic nirvana.
In short, Britain's absence will impact the ideological balance within the EU institutions. In the European Council, the supreme heads of government body, during the UK's membership there were two blocs, each capable of forming a blocking minority against the other: the protectionist bloc of mainly southern states and the freer trade bloc of mainly northern states.
As a member of the northern bloc, the UK's departure will weaken the freer trade bloc. The British were fervent proponents of an economically liberal Europe, larger trade deals with third countries and of further EU enlargement. While weakening the freer trade bloc, it will also strengthen Germany's individual position through the loss of a key counterweight.
Similarly, a majority of the UK's representatives sat with right-leaning groups, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, both of which were built around, and led by members of, the British Conservative Party and UKIP. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats also lost its members from the UK's Labour Party, but on the whole would be left strengthened by the greater loss to the right, and thus able to form majorities without seeking support from the small "c" conservative European People's Party.
The UK was a key asset for the EU in the fields of foreign affairs and defence given that the UK was (with France) one of the EU's two major military powers, and has significant intelligence capabilities, soft power and a far reaching diplomatic network. Without the UK, EU foreign policy could be less influential. The US saw the UK as a bridge between the US and Europe, and Britain helped align the EU positions to the US and provide tougher responses to Russia.
One big unresolved question is the border with Northern Ireland. The problem started when the Irish Republican Army won the partial independence for the Irish Free State in 1921. While that governed predominantly Catholic Ireland, there were six counties in the north, which being Protestant, wished to remain part of Great Britain and formed the British Province of Northern Ireland.
What's to be done with this border is problem that vexes the Eurocrats, as it should have a border crossing with peak-capped officials on both sides opening bags and asking questions. It must be pointed out that this was never the case. Not after its birth as the Irish Free State, nor with its further separation, though mostly semantic, as the Republic of Ireland, was there a proper border with the usual inspection facilities. Even during the worst of the troubles, was there any such thing. One might be accosted by machinegun totting soldiers looking for guns or bombs, but not often. One might well spot Special Branch men in trench coats eying you suspiciously at airports and ferry terminals but not so you'd notice. Even before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, there was no hard border and people could come and go as they pleased.
Post Brexit no one wants a hard border except the EU itself. Not London, not Dublin - only Brussels. The EU in the form of Irish Customs and Immigration would, as EU agents, have to provide the hard border facilities. The British have frustrated the EU by saying do what you like on your side, but we plan to do nothing on ours. The Irish say nothing, but it is plain as day that no one on the Irish side wants a hard border either. They may well pretend to have one, even have the EU build a customs post, but after that, do nothing because in Ireland that's often the best thing to do. |
