With protectionism rising, globalisation with Asian characteristics is ripening as a concept
 AS the western world falls into the clutches of protectionist politicians such as Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the US, Jeremy Corbyn and Nigel Farage in the UK, one can ask if Asia has come of age to take the leadership role in globalisation?
Such is the core question posed by researcher Chietigj Bajpaeem, a doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, writing in Tokyo's Diplomat magazine.
What we find today, he said, are the leading Western powers placing a growing emphasis on protecting national self-interest over projecting global norms, values and institutions as they were proud to do before.
In contrast, the national interests of Asian powers are increasingly intertwined with promoting international trade and regional cooperation and protecting the global commons, said Mr Bajpaeem.
As he sees it, while Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO may have served as the inspiration for Asian regional initiatives such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the latter may ultimately take the reins in defining the process of intra-Asian policy coordination, which given the west's growing absence will include a growing global influence as well.
Another indication of Asia's role in driving globalisation is the fact that Asian countries - whether bilaterally or through multilateral lending institutions such as the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB) - are increasingly looking beyond their shores and regions in seeking economic opportunities.
The AIIB announced four development loans during its inaugural meeting. This included co-financing three projects with the World Bank, ADB, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as the AIIB seeks to build up its capacity and incorporate the best practices of existing multilateral development banks.
The AIIB projects include a highway construction project in Pakistan, road rehabilitation in Tajikistan, and slum development in Indonesia. Moreover, the AIIB's lending activities are unlikely to be confined to Asia as future applicants include more countries from Africa, Latin America, and Europe.
The AIIB is also likely to seek improvements on existing practices of multilateral development institutions by expediting lending processes.
A similar outward engagement has been witnessed at the bilateral level. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) has relaxed its lending requirements to facilitate investment in projects that it may have otherwise neglected.
Through a change to JBIC's operating charter, a newly established special fund will invest in higher risk infrastructure projects. This is part of a broader government plan, known as the Quality Infrastructure Initiative, which aims to increase overseas lending by Japanese-funded development institutions, including JBIC, the ADB, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to allow Japan to more effectively compete with its Chinese counterparts.
This comes in the aftermath of Japan's loss of a tender to China in 2015 for the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project after the China Development Bank (CDB) decided to forego the need for a sovereign guarantee from the Indonesian government, which was required by the JBIC-led consortium.
With respect to China, in addition to the AIIB, China's "Belt and Road" initiative is further evidence of its growing role in intertwining its growth and development agenda with that of its broader periphery. The country is already leading the way in international development finance, with overseas lending by the China Development Bank (CDB) and Export-Import Bank of China matching that of the six major Western-backed development institutions, with the CDB alone overtaking the World Bank as the world's leading provider of international development finance.
When combined with the AIIB, BRICS New Development Bank, and over a dozen regional funds, Chinese development financing far exceeds that of all Western-led multilateral development institutions combined.
Even India has developed a more proactive, pragmatic and omni-directional policy of external engagement under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, aimed at engaging all major poles of influence in the international system, as well as reaching out to the Indian diaspora.
Prime Minister Modi has visited 32 countries in less than two years with the objective of highlighting the attractiveness of the Indian economy and strengthening regional connectivity. This has been done to support his economic development goals and facilitate his "Make in India", "Digital India", and "Smart City" initiatives.
Mr Modi's recent four-nation tour of East Africa has been the most recent evidence of this. Although India's US$70 billion in trade with the African continent pales in comparison to China's $200 billion, India has sought to exploit the country's historical relationship with the continent, such as the 1.3 million Indian diaspora in South Africa.
Despite the hype associated with China's emergence as Africa's leading trade and investment partner, said Mr Bajpaeem, India has so far avoided the allegations of neo-colonialism that have often been associated with China's interactions there.
To be sure, this so-called Asian process of globalisation is still in its nascent stages. A survey by AidData notes, for instance, that despite China providing almost $95 billion in aid and other official financing to Africa between 2000 and 2013, traditional providers of aid and development assistance such as the IMF and World Bank ranked higher than Chinese institutions on their "agenda-setting influence".
Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement (which excludes both India and China) also demonstrate the continued ability of the United States to set the standard on global free trade negotiations, as the TPP raises the bar for future multilateral trade agreements.
In other words, while the focus of Asia's outbound engagement is so far concentrated in the economic domain, the strategic implications cannot be far behind.
There is already evidence of this: Japan's reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution toward facilitating collective self-defence has given the country's Self-Defence Forces the mandate to expand overseas operations.
Meanwhile, China's 2015 defence white paper makes reference to the need to protect Chinese "institutions, personnel and assets abroad", which has been operationalised with a counter terrorism law that was passed in December 2015 that lays the groundwork for the PLA to be sent overseas.
With Europe and the United States potentially retreating into a shell, emerging powers such as China may be further emboldened to challenge international norms and institutions.
But there is no clear Asian consensus on global norms, values, and institutions. Asian powers such as China, India, and Japan have distinctly different views.
Japan is a industrialised country firmly entrenched within the western neoliberal order trying to escape the shackles of the "lost decades" of stagnant growth.
China is a leading global, but still emerging economy seeking to export excess industrial capacity as the country adapts to a "new normal" of more consumption and service-driven growth while rekindling its historical status as the "Middle Kingdom" of old.
India is in the position where China was two decades ago with a focus on attracting foreign investment to upgrade the country's infrastructure and manufacturing capacity while maintaining its status as an independent pole of influence in the international system through a policy of non- or omni-alignment and strategic autonomy.
This has resulted in differing positions on issues as varied as climate change, trade, and development. Furthermore, a so-called Asian-driven process of globalisation would not necessarily repudiate the Western-driven process of globalisation that has existed over the last two centuries.
As such, an Asia-led process of globalisation is likely to entail a reinterpretation rather than complete repudiation of existing norms and values. Certain principles that were seen as increasingly out-dated in the west such as respect for state sovereignty and territorial inviolability - will be reaffirmed. Others related to human rights may undergo a process of reinterpretation as principles such as the "responsibility to protect" come under growing scrutiny.
In this context, countries such as India and Japan are uniquely placed to play the role of potential "bridging powers" in debates on global governance, challenging the simple duality of a so-called "Washington Consensus" (characterised by democracy, neoliberalism, and free market capitalism) and "Beijing Consensus" (characterised by "no-strings attached" value-neutral, state capitalism). |
