Transiting the dire Straits of Hormuz is not risk free
 Unlike the largest conventional bombs, a nuclear detonation can obliterate an entire city in seconds. That is why, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, only a handful of states are permitted to possess nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Israel, India and Pakistan.
The logic is simple enough - those bent on the destruction of Western civilization should not be entrusted with such power. If one accepts that premise, then it follows that groups or regimes unwilling to coexist peacefully with others must be contained, expelled, or defeated. History offers precedent: the Allies demanded unconditional surrender from the Axis powers in World War II. The choice was stark - submit or perish.
Iran’s trajectory since 1979 illustrates the danger of ignoring this logic. The overthrow of the Shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini transformed a rapidly modernizing state into an orthodox Islamic republic. The Shah’s rule was harsh, but the new regime imposed rigid conformity to Islamic norms, and in a figurative sense declared war on Israel and the “Great Satan,” the United States.
Western governments attempted to temper Iran’s hostility with sanctions relief and, in one case, large cash payments. Yet Iran used its oil revenues not to modernise but to fund Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and more recently the Houthis in Yemen, who have disrupted shipping in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea.
Iran’s role as a supplier of oil to China elevated its importance from a regional irritant to a global strategic concern. The Trump administration concluded that if Iran had declared war on America rhetorically, the United States would respond literally. In Venezuela, Washington removed a national leader and left the people to shape a new regime. In Iran, it targeted senior figures and sought to cripple the country’s nuclear ambitions. The aim was not only to prevent Tehran from acquiring a bomb but also to cut off the flow of oil money to its proxies.
Critics warned that such actions risked dragging America into another “forever war,” undermining Trump’s pledge to avoid long-term entanglements like Iraq and Afghanistan. If regime change in Iran proved anything but swift, it could imperil his electoral fortunes. Yet supporters argued that decisive air strikes, followed by a pause in military activity, might stabilize the situation in time for the midterms. The calculus was as much political as strategic.
Still, the obstacles to regime change in Iran are formidable. Analysts note that roughly a quarter of Iranians despise the regime, another quarter support it fervently, and the remaining half simply wish to be left alone.
In such divided societies, the military often emerges as arbiter. But Iran’s armed forces face a rival: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a 250,000-strong paramilitary force with its own Basij militia. Though the regular army is larger on paper, the IRGC is better funded, better organized, and more battle-hardened. Numbers alone are misleading; the IRGC has the sharp edge, while the army is padded with clerks and drivers.
Former CIA officer John Kiriakou has argued that Iran poses no imminent nuclear threat, a view echoed by agency assessments. The International Atomic Energy Agency concurs, though it warns of “transparency issues” and notes that Iran’s uranium enrichment is approaching weapons-grade levels.
The danger lies not only in the technology but in the mindset of those who might wield it. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence rested on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction - MAD. However grotesque, it was rational: both sides knew that a first strike would invite annihilation. The Soviets spent heavily to maintain parity, but when confronted with Western innovations like missile defense, they could not keep pace. Their collapse followed soon after.
Islamist regimes operate on different metrics. Communists, however misguided, envisioned eventual victory and coexistence. Radical Islamists revel in death, even their own. Their moral code, rooted in jihad, sanctions practices abhorrent to modern sensibilities - wife beating, child marriage, stonings, beheadings - and seeks to impose Sharia law wherever possible.
For such actors, nuclear weapons are not tools of deterrence but shields of impunity. Possession of a credible arsenal would make them untouchable, emboldening their proxies to commit outrages without fear of reprisal. One can imagine that if Iran already had nuclear weapons and delivery systems, neither the United States nor Israel would have risked striking its leaders.
The stakes are therefore immense. A swift resolution of the Iranian conflict could deliver a respite of peace and bolster political fortunes in the short term. But the larger question remains unresolved: how does one wage and win a war against an adversary that does not seek compromise, that exults in martyrdom, and that openly declares its intent to dismantle Western civilization?
Iran is not the only front in this struggle, but it is among the most perilous. The Straits of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes, symbolize the fragility of global order. If Iran succeeds in wielding nuclear leverage, the consequences will reverberate far beyond the Middle East.
The West must therefore confront uncomfortable truths. Deterrence worked against the Soviets because they valued survival. It may not work against those who glorify death. Engagement and appeasement have failed to moderate Iran’s behavior. Sanctions have slowed but not stopped its ambitions.
Military action carries risks, but inaction may prove costlier still. The challenge is not merely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but to devise a strategy for dealing with regimes whose worldview makes traditional deterrence obsolete. That is the dire passage we must navigate, and the world cannot afford to founder in the Strait of Hormuz. |
