Weighing factors that will influence relations between mainland Europe and the United Kingdom in the months and years to come
 While the position of the European Union has been to resist the United Kingdom's decision to quit the EU, the European Commission's position is expected to change the means it employs to achieve the same end once British departure is complete.
That is to say, the EU's position will be the same in that it will continue to seek closest possible ties with the UK, but will change tactics to achieve the same end. Instead of offering deals Britain must refuse, as it has done, it will then offer trade terms that are far more attractive so to preserve its export market. Thus, the EU's ends to bring the UK into a closer relationship will remain the same, but its means will differ sharply.
Much of the Remainers' pre-Brexit talk, called "Project Fear", was based the expectation that a mean-spirited, resentful EU would seek revenge and want to get even for separatist spirit that has dominated Britain. Which, in the run up to the 2016 referendum vote and indeed the actual date of departure, was a sound tactical device in the Remain's side in their battle against the Brexiteers.
But was it a real fear of a real post-Brexit situation? Or was it rather like the old saying that treason never prospers because if it were to prosper, none dare call it treason. In the same way, once Brexit is accomplished, the case is altered. Both Remainers and Brexiteers are in the same boat, heading for a future they must share. Under these changed circumstances, attitudes must change.
As a net EU contributor, the UK certainly buys more from the EU than the other way round. The UK had an overall trade deficit of minus GBP64 billion (US$81.6 billion) with the EU in 2018. A surplus of GBP29 billion on trade in services was outweighed by a deficit of minus GBP93 billion on trade in goods. The UK had a trade surplus of GBP44 billion with non-EU countries.
The point is that the UK drives a great many German cars and consumes much French, German, Italian and Spanish liquors. Long before, these exporters start screaming at the European Commission to make a trade deal with Britain, it is fair to say that a virtuous round of talks will start and quickly conclude with a workable modus vivendi.
True, new barriers could arise as a result of a no-deal Brexit in the near term, or in a negotiated future relationship that gives less market access than currently prevails. Even the much vaunted "Canada deal" with additions would involve some new hurdles for exporters to jump.
The UK is a leading export market for the EU, very slightly behind the US, and well ahead of its next biggest exporter, China. But it is important to remember: internal trade within the EU is really big.
The northern range ports have made post-Brexit arrangements. Rotterdam, the biggest, has whittled down the paper work to an extra 15 minutes. This is expected to shrink with practice and more advanced digitization.
Le Havre is the main entrepot to France and its principal export facility. Next comes Calais. While not considered an major ocean port, it is of vital importance as a ferry terminal. It's nearby town of Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais is where the Channel Tunnel, or "chunnel", emerges from its a 50-kilometre railway undersea run from Folkestone, Kent.
Next comes the Belgian Port of Zeebrugge, which until recently, had become sidelined because it had so few callers. But this fact induced China Cosco Shipping to make it its principal northern range port with ample deep water to accommodate the Orient Overseas Container Line's (OOCL) new mega ship, the 21,000-TEU Hong Kong.
Next comes Antwerp, the main Belgium port. It has done very well, though it is 80 kilometres from the sea on the tidal estuary of the River Scheldt. Antwerp's docks are connected to the hinterland by rail, road and canal.
Next comes Rotterdam, the largest port in Europe. From 1962 until 2004 it was the world's busiest port, now overtaken first by Hong Kong, then Singapore and then Shanghai. Like the rest of the Northern Range ports, Rotterdam's hinterland extends beyond the Netherlands and into Germany.
Other ports worth noting are comparatively recent additions of Wilhemshaven, Germany's only deep-water port. The benefits of the deep shipping channel were already recognised at the end of the 1950s with the construction of the first oil tanker jetty. Wilhelmshaven has been the most important German import terminal for crude oil ever since. But now that containerships have grown so large in the Asia-Europe trade, and their need for deep water, Wilhemshaven may well see growing container traffic in its future.
Then there is Hamburg at the eastern end of the Northern Range. It is the third-busiest port in Europe after Rotterdam and Antwerp. It has been beset by environmentalists bent on using every legal maneuvre to stop dredging of the River Elbe needed for large vessels, which is controversial for ecological reasons. Hamburg's big advance, is trade with Russia, principally with St Petersberg by docking those larger Asia-Europe ships, and transshipping to Baltic ports with short-sea feeders.
These are the ports on the mainland side of the English Channel, which stand to lose from Brexit. But it is difficult to imagine those in the EU with a substantial trade not making adjustments needed to enter the UK market. After these ports can expect shippers to continue seek new markets in Britain while doing what they can to preserve what they already hold.
One would not be surprised that after a year post-Brexit, the Britain was looking more like Hong Kong and Singapore in its regulatory set up. Which means it would regulation light. Thus any cross-border trouble that occurs will likely emanate from the EU - and that would only arouse Continental exporters to rebel and perhaps join parties in other countries that also want to leave the customs union. |
